Efficiency invites Divide and Coercion in the Age of Increasing Returns to Scale by Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics 
2019 
Efficiency invites Divide and Coercion in the Age of Increasing 
Returns to Scale 
Yongsheng Xu 
Naoki Yoshihara 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Efficiency invites Divide and Coercion in the Age
of Increasing Returns to Scale
Yongsheng Xu∗and Naoki Yoshihara†
October 10, 2019
Abstract
In the presence of (at least locally) increasing returns to scale tech-
nologies, the paper asks the question: does there exist an economic system
which implements Pareto efficient allocations and respects the voluntary
participation principle? To answer this question, the paper formulates an
economic system as an allocation rule under economies with non-convex
production possibility sets, and proposes a few weaker axioms to repre-
sent the voluntary participation principle. Then, the paper shows that
any Pareto efficient allocation rule satisfies none of the axioms of the vol-
untary participation principle. The result suggests that pursuing Pareto
efficiency in the presence of increasing returns to scale technologies leads
to a dictatorial allocation rule, or forces someone to participate in the
economic system without any guarantee of a minimal living standard.
Keywords: increasing returns to scale technologies, Pareto efficiency, al-
location rule, individual rationality, minimal autonomy, voluntary partic-
ipation
JEL Classification Numbers: D0, D2, D3, D5, D6, P0, P1, P2, P4
1 Introduction
Economists have been fascinated by technologies that exhibit increasing returns
to scale. Increasing returns to scale technologies are regarded as an important
factor behind economic growth (see, for example, Jones (2005)), and economists
are paying more and more attention to such technologies. However, when pro-
duction technologies exhibit increasing returns to scale, production possibility
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sets are non-convex. Non-convexity of production possibility sets may bring
certain difficulties for the market mechanism to allocate resources.
In the first place, it is well-known that non-convex production sets may
create certain efficiency problems in a market economy (e.g., Guesnerie (1975)
and Heal (1999)): market equilibrium outcomes may not be Pareto efficient.
Pareto efficiency is a fundamental and highly desirable principle in economics.
With rare exception, the principle of Pareto efficiency is brought in to evaluate
an economic system that is used for allocating resources. In saying that market
equilibrium outcomes may not be Pareto efficient, the market system is assessed
along this efficiency principle by examining whether or not outcomes emerging
from the market mechanism are efficient.
Secondly, production technologies exhibiting increasing returns to scale may
cause uneven allocations of resources and result in uneven distributions of wealth
in market economies. While increasing returns to scale create externality in so-
cial productivity by promoting cooperative works and the division of labor as
many classical economists such as Smith (1776) and Marx (1867) emphasized,
market exchanges between the industries with increasing returns to scale tech-
nologies and the other industries with non-increasing returns to scale technolo-
gies may lead to uneven development among the agents in the economy: agents
specializing in the former industries (with technologies exhibiting increasing re-
turns to scale) can get richer and agents specializing in the latter industries
become poorer (see, for example, Krugman (1981)). It is therefore fundamen-
tally important to know whether increasing returns to scale technologies are a
driving force to generate uneven allocations of resources and wealth or it is the
market competition that causes such divergence of resources and wealth.
It may be noted that, under the market mechanism, each individual can
decide to participate in market exchanges: she would participate in market
exchanges only if it is preferred to non-participating by her. This voluntary
participation principle implicitly embedded in the market mechanism seems to
suggest that, even if the market economic system can result in uneven allocations
and distributions of resources and wealth mentioned earlier, the extent of such
unevenness ought to be constrained.
With the above difficulties confronted by the market mechanism in the pres-
ence of increasing returns to scale technologies, we ask the following question:
are the difficulties discussed above confined to the market mechanism only or
are they widespread? More formally, we ask this question: in the presence of
increasing returns to scale technologies, is there any economic system that is
Pareto efficient and respects the principle of voluntary participation?
In this paper, we provide an answer to the above question. For this purpose,
we first introduce and define the principle of voluntary participation. Admit-
tedly, the principle of voluntary participation has been used, both implicitly
and explicitly, by economists to evaluate economic systems. The principle can
take various forms, but its basic idea is fairly simple and intuitive, and requires
that individuals must not be coerced into participating in an economic system
if they so desire. We therefore formulate the principle of voluntary participa-
tion in terms of individual rationality: individuals can do no worse than the
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“autarky” situation where they would be left alone and would be on their own
individually. This version of the principle of voluntary participation seems to
capture what Adam Smith (1776) had in mind when he explained how a market
system would work.
Coupled with Pareto efficiency, we take this version of the principle of vol-
untary participation to examine the performance of an economic system. An
economic system is viewed as an allocation rule that is used to select certain
allocations for any given economy. We show that, in the presence of increasing
returns to scale technology, any efficient allocation rule violates the spirit of the
principle of voluntary participation and is not individually rational.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
the basic model for our discussion. Section 3 presents our basic results. Section
4 discusses alternative formulations of the principle of voluntary participation
in different settings and examines their consequences together with the Pareto
efficiency in those settings. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The basic set-up
There are m ≥ 2 goods. Let R (resp. R+ and R++) denote the set of all real
(resp. non-negative and positive) numbers. Let Rm (resp. Rm+ and Rm++) be
the m-fold Cartesian product of R (resp. R+ and R++). For any a, b ∈ Rm,
a > b denotes [a1 ≥ b1, · · · , am ≥ bm and a 6= b], and a  b denotes [a1 >
b1, · · · , am > bm].
There is a fixed number J of firms that are indexed by the set J = {1, · · · , J}.
For each firm j ∈ J , let Yj ⊆ Rm be firm j’s production possibility set. Each
yi = (yj1, · · · , yjm) ∈ Yj is called a production plan for firm j. We assume that
each production possibility set Yj (j ∈ J ) is closed and 0 ∈ Yj . Note that we
allow non-convex production possibility sets. Let Y ≡∑j∈J Yj .
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of individuals (consumers). Each individ-
ual i ∈ N is endowed with an initial endowment, ωi = (ωi1, · · · , ωim) ∈ Rm+ ,
and has a continuous, quasi-concave and monotonic1 utility function over the
consumption set Rm+ . Let Ω =
∑
i∈N ωi. Assume (Y + {Ω}) ∩ Rm++ 6= ∅.
An economy, to be denoted by E, is then defined as follows:
E ≡
〈
N ; (ui, ωi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
.
An allocation, (x,y), in an economy E, specifies a consumption bundle xi
for each individual i ∈ N and a production plan yj for each firm j ∈ J .
An allocation (x,y) is feasible for the economy E if and only if
∑
i∈N xi 5
Ω +
∑
j∈J yj . Let the set of all feasible allocations for E be denoted by F (E).
Given an economy
〈
N ; (ui, ωi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
, a feasible allocation (x,y) is
Pareto efficient for E if and only if there exists no other feasible allocation
1ui is monotonic if, for all a, b ∈ Rm+ , if a > b then ui(a) ≥ ui(b) and if a  b then
ui(a) > ui(b).
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(x′,y′) such that [∀i ∈ N : ui(x′i) ≥ ui(xi)] and [ui(x′i) > ui(xi) for some
i ∈ N ].
Let E denote the set of all possible economies defined above. Given an
economy E in E , there are various ways to select a feasible allocation to be the
final outcome. In general, an allocation rule, ϕ, specifies a non-empty set of
feasible allocations for each economy E in E : for any economy E ∈ E , ∅ 6=
ϕ(E) ⊆ F (E). The market mechanism is a prominent example of an allocation
rule: for a given economy E, it selects competitive equilibrium allocations to be
its final outcomes. We shall refer the allocation rule associated with the market
mechanism as the Walrasian rule.
3 Any efficient allocation rule cannot be indi-
vidually rational
In this section, we consider two properties to be imposed on an allocation rule
and examine their consequences.
To begin with, we require that, for any economy, the allocations selected by
an allocation rule be efficient:
Pareto Efficiency. For any economy E ∈ E and any allocation (x,y) ∈ ϕ(E),
(x,y) is Pareto efficient for E.
Our second property attempts to capture certain aspects of the principle
of voluntary participation, and it requires that, for any economy, an allocation
selected by an allocation rule should give each individual at least as much utility
as the individual would get from an “autarky” situation:
Individual Rationality. For any economy E =
〈
N ; (ui, ωi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
∈ E
and any allocation (x,y) ∈ ϕ(E), ui(xi) ≥ ui(ωi) for all i ∈ N .
In a production economy, there are perhaps alternative ways of defining an
“autarky” situation. One simple and natural autarky situation is the one in
which individuals are left with their initial endowments only. This seems a
very reasonable reference point for individuals to compare if they would like to
participate in an economic system: if an allocation rule selects an allocation
that will make an individual worse off than this reference point, then there is
good reason to believe that the individual would not like to participate in the
economic system.
Our first result is presented in Theorem 1 below; its proof can be found in
the Appendix.
Theorem 1 In the presence of non-convex production possibility sets and with
ωi  0 for every individual i ∈ N , there exists no allocation rule that satisfies
Pareto Efficiency and Individual Rationality simultaneously.
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Therefore, according to Theorem 1, in the presence of increasing returns to
scale technologies, any efficient allocation rule cannot be individually rational.
Stated differently, with increasing returns to scale technologies, if it is desirable
to have an efficient allocation rule, then some individuals would have to be
coerced into participating in the economic system.
In our formulation of Individual Rationality, it is required that no one
be made worse off than the situation given by his/her initial endowment. Ob-
viously, the allocation rule giving all the goods endowed and produced in an
economy to a single individual is Pareto efficient and individually rational for
this single individual (at the expense of all other individuals). But this is hardly
reasonable. Therefore, we ask the following question: Can the property of In-
dividual Rationality be weakened to allow only two individuals who are not
to be coerced into participating in the economic system in order to salvage the
impossibility? We proceed to answer this question below.
Weak Individual Rationality. For any economy E =
〈
N ; (ui, ωi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
∈
E and any allocation (x,y) ∈ ϕ(E), there exist at least two individuals i, i′ ∈ N
such that ωi  0 and ωi′  0, and ui(xi) ≥ ui(ωi) and ui′(xi′) ≥ ui′(ωi′).
Theorem 2 below provides an answer to our question aboove; its proof is in
the Appendix.
Theorem 2 In the presence of non-convex production possibility sets, there ex-
ists no allocation rule that satisfies Pareto Efficiency and Weak Individual
Rationality simultaneously.
Theorem 2 suggests that, in the presence of increasing returns to scale pro-
duction technologies, an efficient allocation rule cannot be “individually ratio-
nal” for just two individuals: the efficient allocation rule would have to “grab”
lots of resources, endowed and produced, from one individual and give them to
the other individual making the first individual worse-off than his initial endow-
ment; the economic system associated with this kind of allocation rule would
thus invite divide and coercion.
4 Alternative formulations of the principle of
voluntary participation
In the formulation of Individual Rationality in the last section, we have
used the initial endowment as a reference point to define an autarky situation.
The formulation implies that each individual’s well-being condition under the
autarky situation is specified by the lives in which the individual uses his/her
own initial endowments only. However, in production economies, the extent to
which an individual can access to technologies is also quite relevant in deter-
mining a reference point to be used as the autarky situation. In other words,
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the information of ownership structures of production technologies matters for
the specification of the reference point in production economies. We turn to
two well-known ownership structures to discuss alternative formulations of the
principle of voluntary participation.
Private ownership economies. To discuss this issue, let us first introduce a
production economy with private ownership as discussed in the standard general
equilibrium model. For each individual i ∈ N and each firm j ∈ J , let θij be
individual i’s shares in firm j’s owned production possibility set: 0 ≤ θij ≤ 1
for all i ∈ N and all j ∈ J , and ∑i∈N θij = 1 for all j ∈ J . For each i ∈ N ,
let θi = (θi1, · · · , θiJ). A private ownership economy, to be denoted by EPO, is
defined as follows:
EPO ≡
〈
N ; (ui, ωi, θi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
.
Let EPO denote the set of all possible private ownership economies thus defined.
Given a private ownership economy, individual i can freely access to resources
within the set
∑
j=1,...,J θijYj + {ωi} regardless of whether she participates in
the implementation of allocation rules. In such a case, the idea of voluntary
participation can be formulated by the following condition:
Individual Rationality under Private Ownership. For any economy EPO ≡〈
N ; (ui, ωi, θi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
∈ EPO and any allocation (x,y) ∈ ϕ(EPO), ui(xi) ≥
maxzi∈(
∑
j∈J θijYj+{ωi}) ui(zi) for all i ∈ N .
Obviously, this axiom is stronger than Individual Rationality. Therefore, as
a corollary of Theorem 1, we have the following result:
Corollary 3 Suppose an allocation rule is defined over EPO. Then, in the
presence of non-convex production possibility sets and with ωi  0 for all i ∈
N , there is no allocation rule that satisfies Pareto Efficiency and Individual
Rationality under Private Ownership.
Public ownership economies. In economies with public ownership, it begins
with a presumption that production technologies are the commons, implying
that every individual can freely access to those technologies under the autarky
situation. Then, as Moulin and Roemer (1989) and Roemer (1996, ch. 6) sug-
gest, the public ownership of technologies should guarantee at least the welfare
level that each individual can enjoy under the free access to those technologies.
A version of individual rationality in this context can be formulated as follows:
Individual Rationality under Public Ownership. For any economy E =〈
N ; (ui, ωi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
∈ E , for any allocation (x,y) ∈ ϕ(E), ui(xi) ≥
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maxzi∈(Y+{ωi}) ui(zi) for all i ∈ N .
Note that Individual Rationality under Public Ownership is stronger than In-
dividual Rationality. The following result is then immediate:
Corollary 4 Suppose an allocation rule is defined over the set of all possible
public ownership economies. Then, in the presence of non-convex production
possibility sets, there is no allocation rule that satisfies Pareto Efficiency and
Individual Rationality under Public Ownership.
The above axiom of Individual Rationality under Public Ownership is sensible,
in particular when the production technology is represented by an increasing re-
turns to scale production function in economies with one-input and one-output,
as Moulin (1987) discussed. Because in such economies, the public ownership
regime brings positive externality by the operation of cooperative production.
However, in a broader class of economies, which contains a type of economies
where the production technologies may not exhibit purely increasing returns to
scale: they exhibit increasing returns to scale locally, but not globally.2 Our
assumption of non-convex production possibility sets allows such production
technologies. For such economies, the public ownership regime may bring nega-
tive externalities. In those cases, Individual Rationality under Public Ownership
seems too strong a requirement to be demanded for the principle of voluntary
participation. This concern brings us to the following.
Minimal living standards. In view of the above discussion, we now consider a
much weaker condition of voluntary participation. For this purpose, let  > 0
be ‘sufficiently small’. Then, for each economy E ∈ E , let G(E) = (Y + {Ω}).
G(E) specifies a minimal sphere of production technology and resources over
which every individual can act autonomously. Then, we have the following
weaker principle of voluntary participation requiring that an allocation rule
should guarantee every individual at least the welfare level that s/he can enjoy
from the chosen activities over this minimal sphere.
Minimal Autonomy. For any economy E =
〈
N ; (ui, ωi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
∈ E ,
for any allocation (x,y) ∈ ϕ(E), ui(xi) ≥ maxzi∈G(E) ui(zi) for all i ∈ N .
This axiom can be motivated not only as a minimal condition of voluntary
participation under public ownership regimes, but also as a condition to ensure
all individuals the minimal standard of living. That is, we may say that there
should be a proper  > 0 such that each individual’s welfare ensured by the
minimal standard of living should be at least as high as the welfare given by the
resources feasibly provided from the production environment G(E). With this
interpretation, Minimal Autonomy suggests that any individual can choose not
2Please see the production technology used in our proof of the Lemma in the Appendix.
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to participate in the implementation of allocation rules unless the individual is
guaranteed at least the minimal standard of living.
Now, we are ready to present our main result of this section. The proof of
Theorem 5 is in the Appendix.
Theorem 5 In the presence of non-convex production sets, there exists no al-
location rule that satisfies Pareto Efficiency and Minimal Autonomy si-
multaneously.
The results discussed in this section send two messages. First, the main implica-
tion of Theorem 1 is still preserved even if the ownership structure of production
technologies is seriously taken into account to define the reference point for vol-
untary participation. Secondly, Theorem 5 implies that in the presence of (at
least locally) increasing returns to scale technologies, it is generally impossible
to implement a moderate welfare state policy without sacrificing Pareto effi-
ciency of resource allocations, taking for granted that any moderate welfare
state policy should guarantee every individual at least a minimal standard of
living.
In an interesting paper, Moulin (1987) shows the compatibility of Pareto
efficiency and a stronger condition than our Minimal Autonomy for one-
input and one-output economies with increasing returns to scale production
functions. Our Theorem 5 is then a bit surprising. It is therefore of interest
to know the main source for the contrast between our Theorem 5 and Moulin’s
(1987) possibility result.
One may initially conjecture that the impossibility result of Theorem 5 would
be observed out of one-input and one-output economies. However, the domain
of economies presumed in Theorem 5 contains the class of one-input and one-
output economies, as we assume m ≥ 2. Indeed, as discussed in the Appendix,
the proof of Theorem 5 is given by considering an economy with m = 2.
The main source is that our domain of nonconvex production possibility sets
is much broader than the domain of production possibility sets considered in
Moulin (1987). In Moulin (1987), the production technology is purely increasing
returns to scale, in that the average productivity is increasing with respect to
labor inputs. Then, as argued by Moulin (1987), the cooperative game derived
from such an economy is convex, and consequently, the existence of non-empty
core is ensured there. In contrast, nonconvex production possibility sets consid-
ered in this paper do not necessarily exhibit purely increasing returns to scale.
Under economies with such a more general type of production technologies, the
corresponding cooperative game cannot be convex in general, and so the exis-
tence of non-empty core is no longer guaranteed. Indeed, the economy with a
nonconvex production possibility set discussed in the proof of Theorem 5 not
only has an empty core, but also has no interior efficient allocation, which implies
the incompatibility between Pareto Efficiency and Minimal Autonomy.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
In the presence of increasing returns to scale technologies, productive efficiency
produces natural monopolies. However, this does not necessarily give us any
definitive view on the distributional feature under the increasing returns to
scale, since it would be generally possible to allocate the productive rewards
in an equitable way even under the monopolized production process. In this
respect, Krugman (1981), by focussing on a specific framework of international
trade between a rich country and a poor country, gives us a case in which the
increasing returns to scale technology in the manufacturing sector may cause
the emergence of uneven development between these countries.
Our main results in this paper are to provide a comprehensive view, beyond
perspective of the market economy, on economic systems used for allocating re-
sources under increasing returns to scale. We have shown that, in the presence
of (at least locally) increasing returns to scale technologies, any efficient alloca-
tion rule cannot be individually rational; in such an environment, to maintain
efficiency of an allocation rule, some individuals would have to be coerced into
participating in the economic system. As our Theorem 2 suggests further, in or-
der to have an efficient allocation rule (and thus an economic system promoting
efficiency), all but one individuals would have to be coerced into the partici-
pation of the economic system. Stated differently, the existence of increasing
returns to scale technologies can only benefit one individual if efficiency is main-
tained as a goal for the economic system. In this sense, efficiency invites divide
and coercion. Our results thus re-inforce Krugman’s (1981) thesis.
If production possibility sets are all convex, and, given our assumptions on
the utility functions of the individuals and on their initial endowments, the
existence of a competitive market equilibrium is ensured, and therefore, the
Walrasian rule is both Pareto efficient and individually rational in this envi-
ronment. But once an economy has production technologies that exhibit (at
least locally) increasing returns to scale, the incompatibility of Pareto efficiency
and individual rationality occurs. Given the prevalence of increasing returns to
scale in the modern economy of knowledge and ideas, our results present a real
dilemma.
It seems that Individual Rationality and Weak Individual Rationality
are fairly weak requirements on an allocation rule. Any further weakening of
Weak Individual Rationality would call for a “dictator”, but a ‘dictatorial’
allocation rule would be highly unacceptable. If this is a reasonable argument,
then, to resolve the dilemma, Pareto efficiency would have to be sacrificed.
Given the efficiency problems associated with increasing returns to scale in
market economies, this route of non-insistence on Pareto efficiency might be
a better way of resolving the dilemma.
Individual Rationality and Weak Individual Rationality can be in-
terpreted differently from a different perspective. It can be argued that, a rea-
sonable economic system should i) offer opportunities to individuals for them
to freely choose whether or not to participate in the system, and ii) fulfill and
respect individuals’ decisions. Note that the decision “to participate” or “not
9
to participate” in an economic system by an individual can be regarded as this
individual’s personal choice over his/her ‘personal matters’. In this case, the
participation of the individual to the economic system is due to his own free
choice, and his choice is fulfilled and respected only if he prefers participation to
“non-participation and living autarkically by himself’. Viewed this way, Weak
Individual Rationality demands that there should be at least two individuals
whose own choices over the issue of participation to the economic system being
fulfilled and respected by the economic system. This interpretation of Weak
Individual Rationality is closely related to and connected with Sen’s (1970)
Minimal Liberalism introduced for his now well-known liberal paradox: Sen’s
Minimal Liberalism requires the existence of two individuals and two pairs of
social alternatives (concerning their respective personal matters), one for each
individual, so that each individual’s respective preferences over his pair of so-
cial alternatives be respected by a social decision rule. Sen (1970) then shows
the incompatibility of Minimal Liberalism and the weak Pareto principle for
an acyclic social decision rule. His result has become known as the Paretian
liberal paradox. In a way and given our interpretation of Weak Individual
Rationality above, our result of Theorem 2 demonstrates a similar paradox
emerging in a very different environment.
Likewise, we have also introduced Minimal Autonomy, which is regarded
as a weaker individual rationality condition suited in economies with public
ownership of technologies, and it also can be motivated as a requirement of
the minimal standard of living guaranteed for individuals in an economy. In a
way, Minimal Autonomy specifies the minimal necessary condition that any
welfare state policy should satisfy. Then, our Theorem 5 suggests the tension
between Pareto efficiency and this minimal standard of living requirement in
the presence of (at least locally) increasing returns to scale technologies. Thus,
a trade-off between efficiency and Minimal Autonomy has to be made: when-
ever we take the minimal standard of living guaranteed as the first priority of
the society in a welfare state, we may have to sacrifice economic efficiency.
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Appendix
Let ε ∈ (0, 1) be sufficiently small. For an economy E =
〈
N ; (ui, ωi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
∈
E , let ε(Y + {Ω}) = {εz ∈ Rm | z ∈ Y + {Ω}}.
Consider the following property:
A1. For any two individuals i, i′ ∈ N , any economy E =
〈
N ; (ui, ωi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
∈
E , for any allocation (x,y) ∈ ϕ(E),
ui(xi) ≥ max
zi∈ε(Y+{Ω})∩Rm+
ui(zi) and ui′(xi′) ≥ max
zi′∈ε(Y+{Ω})∩Rm+
ui′(zi′).
In this Appendix, we first provide the proof for the following lemma. Then,
each of Theorems 1, 2 and 5 can be shown as a corollary to the Lemma.
Lemma. In the presence of non-convex production possibility sets, there exists
no allocation rule that satisfies Pareto Efficiency and A1 simultaneously.
Proof. We consider the case in which m = 2. Our proof method can be
extended to the case involving more than 2 goods. Let ε ∈ (0, 12), and let
a ∈ R+ be such that a > 1−εε . Note that a > 1. Let 1, 2 ∈ N be two consumers
whose utility functions are given below:3
u1 (x11, x12) ≡ min
{x11
a
, x12
}
and u2 (x21, x22) = min
{
x21,
x22
a
}
.
Suppose all other individuals have the same utility function as individual 1’s
utility function (it will become clear that this is not important).
3The specific utility functions are used here to provide a simplest economy to establish our
result. We may note that, at the expense of increasing complexity, it is possible to consider
a more standard type of utility functions, such as strongly monotonic utility functions rather
than the Leontief utility functions, for the proof.
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Consider the economy E associated with Y + {Ω} ≡ comp {(a, 1) , (1, a)}.4
Thus, ε (Y + {Ω}) = comp {ε (a, 1) , ε (1, a)}. Then, A1 implies that, for any
(x, y) ∈ ϕ (E), u1 (x1) = min
{
εa
a , ε
}
= ε and u2 (x2) = min
{
ε, εaa
}
= ε. The
latter implies that x21 = ε and x22 = εa. Therefore, to be a Pareto efficient allo-
cation, x11 5 a− ε and x12 5 1− εa. Therefore, u1 (x1) 5 min
{
a−ε
a , 1− εa
}
=
1− εa. Thus,
ε 5 u1 (x1) 5 1− εa. (1)
Likewise,
ε 5 u2 (x2) 5 1− εa. (2)
However, note that
1− εa− ε = 1− ε (a+ 1)
< 1− ε
(
1− ε
ε
+ 1
)
= 0,
implying that
1− εa < ε.
Thus, there is no feasible allocation satisfying either (1) or (2).
Proof of Theorem 2. Let a ∈ R+ be such that a > 1−εε is sufficiently larger
than 1, and then consider the same economy as in the proof of Lemma. In
particular, let us choose ε ∈ (0, 1/2) sufficiently small so that ε (Y + {Ω})∩Rm+ ≡
comp {ε (a, 1) , ε (1, a)}∩Rm+ ⊆ {z ∈ Rm+ | z ≤ ωi ∧ωi′} holds for the individuals
with ωi  0 and ωi′  0.5 Moreover, the profile of utility functions is defined
as in the proof of Lemma by taking
ui (xi1, xi2) ≡ min
{xi1
a
, xi2
}
and ui′ (xi′1, xi′2) = min
{
xi′1,
xi′2
a
}
.
Then, as ϕ satisfies Weak Individual Rationality for the individuals i, i′ ∈
N , it also meets the property of A1 for the specified economy with individuals
i, i′ ∈ N . Thus, Lemma implies that there is no allocation rule that satisfies
both Pareto Efficiency and Weak Individual Rationality. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Note that if an allocation rule satisfies Individual
Rationality, then it satisfies Weak Individual Rationality. Then, from
Theorem 2, Theorem 1 follows easily. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Let a ∈ R+ be such that a > 1, and then consider
the same economy as in the proof of Lemma. Then, as ϕ satisfies Mini-
mal Autonomy, there exists a sufficiently small  > 0 such that G(E) ≡
comp { (a, 1) ,  (1, a)}. By taking a as sufficiently larger than 1, we can ensure
4For any two points, (s1, s2), (t1, t2) ∈ R2, comp{(s1, s2), (t1, t2)} is defined as the set
{(q1, q2) ∈ R2 | (s1, s2) ≥ (q1, q2) or (t1, t2) ≥ (q1, q2)}.
5Note that for any z, w ∈ Rm+ , z ∧ w ≡ (min {zk, wk})k=1,...,m.
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that a > 1− holds. Moreover, ϕ satisfies Minimal Autonomy, it also satisfies
A1 for the individuals 1, 2 ∈ N . Then, Lemma implies that there is no allo-
cation rule that satisfies both Pareto Efficiency and Minimal Autonomy.

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